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TULSA LAW JOURNAL
Utilizing the doctrine of the MacPherson case, the courts
will likely impose a duty on the manufacturer to use due
care in ascertaining the effect of his product on hypersensi-
tive consumers and to warn the consumer of any discovered
danger. Although the imposition of that duty might result
in strict liability, it would have the beneficial effect of
hastening the elimination of allergens from many products.
The Sterling Drug case appears to be the beginning of
strict liability in the field of prescription products. It does
not seem highly improbable that such liability will, in the
very near future, extend into the field of non-prescription
products.
Jack R. Anderson
ANTITRUST-Standards for the Conglomerate Merger
Procter & Gamble, a large, diversified manufacturer of
low price, high turnover household products - primarily
soaps, detergents and cleaners - merged with Clorox Chemi-
cal Company, the leading manufacturer in the heavily con-
centrated household liquid bleach industry. The Federal
Trade Commission ordered divestiture.1
Without placing any reliance on post-acquisition evidence,
the Commission found that the merger violated Section 7 of
the Clayton Act.2 The Commission believed the merger might
gubstantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly
in the production and sale of household bleaches. The sub-
stitution of Procter's huge assets and advertising advantages
1 FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 63 F.T.C. -- (1963), rev'd,
358 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1966), rev'd, 87 S. Ct. 1224 (1967).
2 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
[Vol. 5, No. I
1
Pinskey: Antitrust--Standards for the Conglomerate Merger
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1968
ANTITRIST
for the already dominate Clorox would dissuade new firms
from entering the bleach market as well as discourage active
competition from firms already in the industry. There was
danger that Procter might underprice its Clorox bleach in
order to drive out competition by subsidizing the loss with
revenues from other products. Because they might stock
other products manufactured by Procter, retailers could be
induced to give favored shelf space to Procter's Clorox bleach.
The Commission also pointed out that the merger would
seriously diminish potential competition. Prior to the merger,
Procter was the most likely entrant into the liquid bleach
industry. Without the merger, Procter would have remained
on the periphery and restrained Clorox from exercising its
dominant market power. The practical tendency of the merg-
er was to transform the bleach industry into a market where
only big businesses could successfully compete. Unable to
compete with their giant rivals, the remaining small firms
would fall by the wayside.3
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit set aside the
Commission's order. The court held the Commission's finding
of illegality to be mere "treacherous conjecture" based upon
hypotheses which the evidence showed had never taken place.4
Even though Clorox controlled almost fifty percent of the
household liquid bleach industry and only six firms controlled
eighty percent, the court dismissed the fact that the market
was oligopolistic. It relied heavily on post-acquisition evi-
dence to point out that subsequent to the merger producers
were selling more bleach for more money than ever before5
and that there had been no significant change in Clorox's
market share in the four years subsequent to the merger.
The Supreme Court, in reversing the circuit court, stated
3 87 S. Ct. at 1228-229.
4 358 F.2d at 83.
5 Cf. Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 87 S.Ct. 1326
(1967) (similar argument involving price war).
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that the court had misinterpreted the standard applicable in
a Section 7 proceeding.6 All mergers are within the reach of
Section 7, whether they are classified as horizontal,7 vertical8
or conglomerate.9 The purpose of Section 7 is to arrest the
anticompetitive effects of market power in their incipiency.
The core question is whether a merger may substantially les-
sen competition. This necessarily requires a prediction of the
merger's impact on both present and future competition.10
Section 7 deals with probabilities only, not certainties.1
Since the 1957 decision of United States v. E. I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co.,12 numerous legal periodicals discussed the
antitrust problems faced by large corporations seeking to
6 87 S. Ct. at 1229.
T A horizontal merger is an acquisition by a producer of the
stock or assets of a firm producing an identical product or
close substitute and selling in the same geographic market.
Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, 78 HARv. L. REV. 1313, 1315 (1965).
8 A vertical merger is an acquisition of the stock or assets of
a firm that buys the products sold by the acquirer or sells
a product bought by the acquirer. Id.
9 A pure conglomerate merger is one in which there are no
discernible economic relationships between the business of
the acquiring and the acquired firm. Id.
Mixed conglomerates have some vertical or horizontal re-
lationships. They include the acquisition of a firm produc-
ing the same product as the acquirer but selling in a
different geographic market, and the acquisition of a com-
pany manufacturing a different product which is never-
theless related to a product or products of the acquiring
firm because it can be produced with much the same facil-
ities, sold through the same distributing channels, or made
a part of the same research and development efforts. Id.
10 87 S. Ct. at 1229.
11 Id.; Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 323 (1962).
12 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
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diversify into other areas through the process of merger.'$
The central themes of the articles favoring the corporate
position are:
1. Large corporations are being penalized for their
bigness by being deprived of the economies that
are possible by entering a new industry through
merger.
2. Other than in theory, it has not been proved that
mergers of this type actually have an anti-compe-
titive effect.
Donald Turner, head of the Antitrust Division of the De-
partment of Justice, has suggested that the antitrust standards
should be less severe on conglomerate mergers than on other
types of mergers. He believes the anticompetitive conse-
quences of the conglomerate merger are the least predictable.
The arrangement simply substitutes one firm for another and
leaves the industry concentration as it was. 14
To understand why the Court has ignored all of these
arguments one must realize that "Etihe problem of antitrust
is a problem of the use of power."15 The antitrust laws
arose as a reaction to the rising tide of economic concentra-
tion in the American economy. They are the political ex-
pression of the American belief in a free enterprise system.
In the famous United States v. Trenton Potteries Co. decision,
Mr. Justice Stone remarked that
Etlhe power to fix prices whether reasonably exercised
or not, involves the power to control the market and
13 See, e.g., Blair, The Conglomerate Merger in Economics
and Law, 46 GEo. L.J. 672 (1958); Bok, Section 7 of the
Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74
HALv. L. REv. 226 (1960); Turner, supra note 7.
14 Turner, supra note 7, at 1320, 1322.
15 Hamilton, The Legal Tolerance of Economic Power, 46
GEo. L.J. 561 (1958).
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to fix arbitrary and unreasonable prices. The reason-
able price fixed today may . . . become the unreason-
able price tomorrow . . . . Agreements which create
such potential power may well be held to be in them-
selves unreasonable or unlawful restraints, without the
necessity of minute inquiry whether a particular price
is reasonable or unreasonable as fixed and without
placing on the Goverrnent... the burden of ascertain-
ing from day to day whether it has become unreasonable
through the variation of economic conditions.16
Mr. Justice Stone feared that the Court might become the
battleground of rival economic philosophies.
The reference to Trenton Potteries should not infer that
anytime a large corporation seeks to diversify through merger
it should be struck down as anticompetitive per se. The effect
of any particular merger depends not only upon the physical
structure of the market entered, but also upon the power
relationships which exist between the competitors.17 The
size of a firm, its sales in dollars, and its percent of the total
market give important information in determining its anti-
competitive effect. However, the relative effect of all factors
varies with the setting into which they are placed. Competition
is not a static thing-it is action and reaction. Under the theory
of workable competition, no competitor can reasonably make
a marketing decision without considering the response his
actions will evoke from the others.18 In any industry a
given equilibrium should be established which reflects the
relative power and behavior of the component firms. It is the
task of the antitrust lawyers to predict the extent to which
merger will alter this established equilibrium.19
An atomistic industry is one in which there are generally
small competitors, none of whom possess any monopoly power.
16 273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1927).
17 See REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GmERAi's NATIONAL COm-
MITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 43-62 (1955).
18 Id. at 315-42.
19 Supra note 17.
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If a firm possessing monopoly or oligopoly power in another
industry enters an atomistic industry, it will significantly
affect the action of competitors in the newly entered market.20
Aware of their vulnerability to the leverage which could be
applied by the conglomerate, small firms may be reluctant
to challenge their new competitor. Yet, this problem exists
whether the conglomerate enters the new industry through
merger or internal expansion. No law states that a firm may
not compete because of its size.21
The problem is different in an oligopolistic market. The
industry is dominated by a few concerns which possess,
either individually or collectively, monopoly power.22 The sub-
stitution of a large diversified company, possessing great
market power, for one of the oligopolists would be considered
good business. It merges the resources and marketing ability
of the former with the industrial know-how of the latter.
However, redeeming social or economic values will not save
an act when it violates the antitrust laws. Congress supposedly
weighed these values when it amended Section 7. "It there-
fore proscribed anticompetitive mergers, the benign and ma-
lignant alike, fully aware . . . that some price may have
to be paid."23
If Procter entered the household liquid bleach market
through internal expansion, it is probable that it would have
become one of the oligopolists, challenging Clorox for its
share of that market.24 The Commission noted that Procter
was the most likely entrant to the industry. It must be
remembered that Clorox had the particular knowledge of
the household liquid bleach industry which Procter desired
20 Blair, supra note 13, at 690.
21 United States v. United States Steel Co., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
2 Blair, supra note 13, at 693.
23 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371
(1963).
24 87 S. Ct. at 1229.
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to obtain and utilize. Without it, an entry by Procter was
subject to new-market blunders.
In United States v. First National Bank25 the Court noted
that "the image of bigness" is a powerful attraction to cus-
tomers, an advantage that increases progressively with size.
The Commission doubted that the remaining companies could
compete with the aggressive campaign that Procter could
muster. The natural effect of this type of merger is for small
companies to drop out of competition and large companies
to seek merger. What was once an oligopoly of relatively
small companies could be transformed into a triopoly or duo-
poly of corporate giants.
This danger of superconcentration underlies all antitrust
laws. Mr. Justice Brennan, in United States v. Philadelphia
National Bank, stated that because of Congress' intense con-
cern with superconcentration, certain cases should warrant
dispensing with elaborate proof of market structure, market
behavior or probable anticompetitive effects.26 In the Phila-
delphia National Bank case, the large percent of the market
controlled by the bank resulted from the merger of two large
competitors. The Court held that the merger was "inher-
ently likely to lessen competition." "Such a test lightens the
burden of proving illegality only with respect to mergers
whose size makes them inherently suspect in light of Con-
gress' design in Section 7 to prevent undue concentration."27
This approach was applied in the Procter & Gamble case.
However, instead of comparing the size of the competitors,
the Court was concerned with the great change the merger
would make in the market's power equilibrium.
Not all conglomerate mergers involving large firms will
be struck down. An analysis of each merger will involve:
1. looking at the purpose of amended Section 7,
25 376 U.S. 665, 669 (1964) (the Lexington Bank case).
26 374 U.S. at 363.
27 Id.
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2. identifying the physical structure of the relevant
market, and
3. studying the power relationships in that market.
Only where this analysis proves inconclusive will resort to
post-merger facts be made.
Any other test will hold a merger suspect and subject
to antitrust prosecution years after the event. An otherwise
lawful merger could become unlawful because of a twist of
economic circumstances. Likewise, where a potential mo-
nopoly has failed to exercise its tremendous power and has
been a "good trust," it is nonetheless subject to the law.28
Certainty is best obtained through simplicity.
Ralph B. Pinskey
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